Wednesday, February 23, 2011

Properly Defining "Sea Change"

The phrase sea change is tossed around with reckless disregard by the media.  Everything and anything that is new or different is labeled as a sea change.

The release of a new iPhone model is not a sea change.
Carmelo Anthony joining the Knick is not a sea change.
Republicans winning more seats in Minnesota's state senate is not a sea change.

A few day span featuring protesters revolting, air force pilots defecting to Malta, ambassadors resigning, defense and interior ministers switching sides, cities falling, and the potential end of 42 years of tyrannical rule in the Libya?  Sea change, in the southern Mediterranean.

Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi's recent antics have been of typical fashion--ranging from the maniacal to the diabolical.  Lunatic rantings about how Egyptians were coming to steal petroleum; that the youth had been given hallucination pills to turn against him; to sending French-made Mirage jets to strafe residential neighborhoods in Tripoli.  He's pulling out all the stops to hold on to his quickly evaporating power.

Gaddafi plans to make the inevitable end of his reign as bloody as possible, vowing to fight to the very end.  His hiired thugs are roaming the streets and sub-Saharan African mercenaries are reportedly on killing sprees [see prior post for story on Bahraini mercenaries].  The following days for Libya are likely to be both chaotic and deadly--with the distinct possibility of a violent ouster of the despot who once allegedly plotted to kill the King of Saudi Arabia.  This indeed qualifies as a sea change.  AT&T's offering of free mobile-to-mobile minutes, does not.

Correction:  Updated reports describe the Libyan jets that defected to Malta as MiG-23s, not Mirages.

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Bahrain's Mercenary Army

The unrelenting seeds of North African revolt have been deeply planted in the island state of Bahrain.  The archipelago, home to 1.2 million western Persian Gulf residents of predominately Arab descent, has experienced a catacyslm--its people have awoken from a deep slumber.  And they are now empowered by an elusive, recurrent dream: freedom.

Last week, protesters gathered in the Pearl Rounabout in the heart of the capital city of Manama, to express their newfound voice.  They passionately called for fair elections, the release of political prisoners, and social reform. Their requests were instead met with rounds of live ammunition resutling in scenes of utter horror and death. The demonstrators were not silenced. Instead, they returned with more fervor and a new, stronger demand: the immediate departure of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa.

Bahrain is 99% Muslim, and approximately 70% of the populace is of the Shia sect.  The ruling Al Khalifa family, which has held power for two hundred years, is Sunni.  The Shia are essentially a disenfranchsied majoirty with diminished civil rights--unable to procure jobs in the military and positions of influence, power and wealth. Although the protests were largely framed as political, they were overwhelmingly dominated by the Shia; the sectarian flavor, obvious. Nearby international powers understand this paradigm and are well aware of the potential implications. Riyadh fears a spillover of dissent into the oil-rich, Shia populated eastern Saudi Arabian front.  Washington fears that a possible Shia takeover will lead to undoubtedly friendlier relations with Iran, and the dismissal of the US 5th Navy Fleet stationed in Manama.

The Bahraini government has attempted to shift the Shia-heavy population balance by granting citizenship to over 50,000 Sunni foreigners. These immigrants from South Asia and other neighboring Arab countries are granted passports by Manama. Notably, it is nearly impossible for foreigners to naturalize in Gulf states--given the context, this policy is a very, big deal.  Much like the importation of ethnic Han Chinese into Tibet, the Sunni newcomers are offered many advantages and benefits, slowly changing both the character and composition of the nation.  In addition, many guest workers competing for employment are non-local, South Asians, further engendering class-oriented, ethnic, and religious strife.

The Bahraini Defence Force has been suppressing the current revolution as well as prior political uprisings.  It acts in concert with special forces and civilian paramilitary units.  Military and particularly special force recruits are composed of many Sunnis from abroad, promised with money and quite often, citizenry.  The foreign recruits are chosen for a particular reason--their differing ethnicity, language, and religious leanings will allow them to control the local population with less qualms and the absence guilt.  A mercenary army has been created.

The mercenaries hail from Yemen, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq (former Ba'athists from the fallen regime of Saddam). The officers of these disliked special forces are from the Arab states.  According to Ian Black of The Guardian, "a Jordanian official is currently described as the organisation's [national security agency] 'master torturer'."

The largest contingent of the mercenary army is from Pakistan--up to 35% of these forces are from its southwestern province of Baluchistan. They primarily serve as foot soldiers. Reports of recruiting Pakistanis of Baluchi descent date back to 1992.  There is an alleged Bahraini recruitment delegation that makes trips to the southern coastal strip of Makran, on the Arabian Sea. This region, once a stronghold of the Persian Empire, is where modern-day warriors are now lured westward, with promises of cash and power. The Baluchi soldiers of fortune are often from destitute backgrounds with little hope of economic betterment in their homeland.  Their fiscally motivated departures to Bahrain are met with much chagrin among the locals.  Leaders of the many Baluchi secessionist movements--the Baluchi Liberation Front and the Baluch Republican Army among them, plead for them to stay home and utilize their energies and restiveness against the subjugating Pakistani Army.  They want these would-be mercenaries to fight the local tyrants--not cross the sea, and work for another.  Not surprisingly, money wins out.

The Bahraini military and mercenary forces have been known to act in concert with armed, "imported" Sunni civilians to quell political disobedience. Reportedly, they have participated in raids to pursue and abduct activists and demonstrators.  Use of internationally recruited soldiers is banned by international law. Human rights organizations in Bahrain understand the governmental manipulation of turning impoverished Baluchis into legionnaires. They have called for improved education within Baluchistan regarding the illegality of this work as well as direct condemnation of the Al Khalifa policy.  However, as long as there is a financial incentive from Bahrain, the flow of professional soldiers across the Persian Gulf is unlikely to stop.

Saturday, February 19, 2011

Pipelines and Pipedreams



Pepe Escobar appropriately dubs the most important region in the world as Pipelineistan.  It is the heart of Asia: the confluence of the Middle East with Central and South Asia. Pipelineistan's immense reserves of oil and gas and the myriad, dizzying array of potential pipeline networks within, give credence to this name. Local militas to world superpowers--all are stakeholders of this precious land--and battle on for the control and distribution of its copious amounts of liquid gold.  Pipelineistan is the ultimate geopolitical powder keg and there more than a few matches in the vicinity.  Instability and conflict are ongoing.

Ground zero of this war lies in Baluchistan--the large, arid southwestern province of Pakistan and it contains the ulimate prize:  the deep, warm-water, port city of Gwadar.  Baluchistan consumes almost half of the land in Pakistan but represents less than four percent of its population. The barren, sparse unheralded land of the Baluch is the focal point of Pipelineistan and it holds the potential key to future peace and prosperity; or alternatively, to one that may unlock more death and destruction.

It is well-established that natural resources are a finite commodity.  The future of energy undoubtedly needs to be produced from green, renewable sources in entirety.  It is debatable if that time will be reached in fifty or five hundred years.  Fast, emerging markets in the largest population centers of the world--China and India, are further taxing a continually increasing demand of oil and gas.  With supply dwindling, the resource wars have only intensified, and rage onward.

The rich natural gas reserves in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia have always been challenged with the problem of efficient distribution.  The dream scenario--access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean has proven elusive. This route faces the daunting task of making its way through a perennially unstable Afghanistan, and ultimately the perilous sands of Baluchistan--to Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea.  With stationary gas yearning to be transported, potential profit is being flagrantly wasted.


It has been largely argued that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was for this very reason--to clear and control land for profit-making pipelines. The USSR's Afghan occupation of the 1980s also caused immense distress within Pakistan, as it believed that it was next in line for hostile Russian activities.  There was a palpable fear of Russia annexing Baluchistan, in order to complete the goal of this ultimate pipeline. [Pakistani fears were exacerbated by the Russian alliance with its eastern neighbor/enemy, India.  Pakistan had enemy troops on both borders and felt the squeeze, much like modern day Iran, surrounded by vast amounts of US troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan]  The Soviet occupation failed largely due to Amero-Pak collaboration in funding and training the Afghani resistance fighters better known as mujahideen--a time when the US and Pakistan openly supported "jihad".   Eventually, the conflict resulted in a Soviet loss, with a subsequent withdrawal completed in 1989.  This may have killed USSR's  "pipe dream", but it only created hope and opportunity for other imperialists lying in wait.


Unocal Corporation, once a major American petroleum player (now dissolved into a Chevron subsidiary), had wide-eyed plans to deliver gas from the land-locked Caspian to the blue waters of the Arabian Sea.  Upon the breakup of the USSR, the newly independent Central Asian republics were ripe for American desires, to cash in on this money train.  As the Taliban were slowly taking over Afghanistan, Unocal was prepping the course for the pipeline.  Negotiations between Unocal and the Taliban failed despite their close links [it has been widely reported that Unocal security forces and the CIA helped the Taliban take Kabul].  No deal came to fruition and by mid-2001 the Bush regime had decided that the Taliban would be forcibly removed.  After 9/11, in late 2001, with a very convenient narrative to chase out the Taliban, the United States was able to gain the footing it had always desired, by invading Afghanistan.  A lightning, quick victory with complete territorial control never materialized.  The Taliban decided to retreat from the cities, regroup, and return in periodic waves, years later, badgering the diminishing NATO forces.  This unexpected, long guerilla war sidetracked any American ability to build and secure a pipeline.

Plans to develop this pipeline have not died but have been put on hold indefinitely. It has become increasingly clear after a fledgling, decade long American-led occupation, that reigning in the submission of the Afghans is untenable.  The only hopes to build a Trans-Afghan Pipeline (TAP) will be through negotiating a peace.  NATO will have to withdraw--the only questions are when, and on what terms.  The United States did not heed the historic lessons of Afghanistan--they are a people that are not conquered.  The Soviets failed.  The British failed.  Genghis Khan failed.


Meanwhile, over the past decade, Iran also has been planning to develop a pipeline to fulfill its ambitions to export its vast stockpiles of natural gas from the South Pars field in the Perisan Gulf.  South Pars is quite likely the largest gas field in the world, shared by Iran and Qatar.  Due to a variety of reasons ranging from economic to political to philosophical, Iran has become increasingly isolated from much of the Western world--largely due to the influence of its arch-nemesis, the United States.  Iran not only wants to find a customer for its natural gas product, but to diversify its oil-based portfolio.

Iran has proposed the Iran-Pakistan-India or IPI pipeline. This $7.2 billion USD project will supply natural gas to both Pakistan and its sworn enemy/neighbor, India (which is why it is also known as the "peace pipeline.")  India needs the gas for its expanding population and rapid industrial growth.  Pakistan needs the gas as well, but it stands to profit more by the rent it can earn from India and Iran as a crucial part of the supply chain.  There are many issues that complicate this deal.  India and Pakistan have fought three deadly wars in little over 60 years of existence and do not trust each other;  instability in Pakistan, particularly in Baluchistan will certainly threaten the security of such a line;  and most importantly, the United States and its Western counterparts are firmly against it.  The IPI pipeline would not only stenghten Iran, but put into doubt, and likely crush the development of a Trans-Afghan pipeline--destroying one of the underlying goals of the long, costly Afghan occupation.


The easiest way for the US to sabotage the IPI is to eliminate the end-user.  India, perhaps the key to making the project viable, allegedly pulled out of the deal in late 2009.  [However, this remains unofficial and its participation still remains in play, at least according to Iran. There are reports of India's renewed interest in trilateral talks with Pakistan and Iran.]  There are strong suspicions that India is bowing out as a precondition set by the US for implementation of the Indo-American civilian nuclear deal of 2008. India also remains afraid of making any deal with its mortal enemy, Pakistan and further blames it for demanding too exorbitant a cost as the middle man.  Pakistan and Iran have inked a deal to go onwards with the IP pipeline--much of the construction on the Irani side is alleged to be complete. It is well-known that America is pressuring Pakistan to withdraw completely as well.  They are being offered various forms of aid to captiulate and many believe that evenutally there will be a sweet enough deal to make that happen (and it probably already has, at least temporarily with the existing Pakistani government).  It is not exactly a hidden secret either that Pakistani leadership operates under American instruction, co-opted;  the American ambassador in Islamabad, effectively a viceroy.

Ideally, the United States, in its self-proclaimed role as the world superpower would like to be in charge of distribution of gas and still offers to Pakistan the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAP) also known as Turkmenistan-Afgahnistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline.  TAPI would originate in the Dauletabad gas fields near the Turkmenistan-Iran border, in the Amu-Darya basin.  Turkmenistan is also home to the Yolotan-Osman fields of the Caspian, reportedly home to 14 trillion cubic centimeters of nautral gas--5 times the size of Dauletabad--which could be linked by a spoke.  This gas is fervently seeking  a non-Russian escape route to the southeast [there is a line from Dauletabad to Iran].  However, for many reasons already noted such as the little problem the Americans are facing in Kandahar (a key node in the line), the development of such a line remains far more theoretical than practical.  Thus, the United States is more likely to derail the IPI/IP line by other forms of aid/bribe to Pakistani higher-ups.

Wakhan Corridor

In reality, the TAP/TAPI pipelines are currently nothing short of a pipedream.  The failed NATO excursion in Afghanistan has cemented another cycle of quasi-permanent instability.  Even the world's largest armies have been unable to provide the security that any corporation requires to protect their investment.  This leaves the United States dangling the smaller carrot to Pakistan of building a pipeline through the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan.  Wakhan is the easternmost extent of Afghanistan, lying in the Pamir Mountains, between Tajikistan and the Hindu Kush mountain range of Pakistan.  This sparsely populated panhandle is better known for snow leopards, drug smuggling and the largest time zone change in the world (3.5 hours) than as a potential gas route.  Furthermore, construction in this region will be nearly impossible given its rough terrain and that of the adjacent Pakistani Northern Areas.  This option fails for Pakistan for a multitutde of reasons--Pakistan can not pay for gas imports alone and needs additional countries beyond it to collect rent money. Moreover, the development of Gwadar, which is not a part of the proposed route, is absent.

As for the IPI/IP line--what would be India's loss by pulling out, would be somebody else's gain--none other than its long time rival, China.  China covets the same South Pars gas as India and both Iran and Pakistan are lobbying hard for it to step into the deal, and save the day.  In fact, the port city of Gwadar has largely been built by China (over $0.2 billion USD invested) and it probably held such intentions for a long time [it has been reported that China has sovereign rights over Gwadar's port facilities and some speculate it could be guarded by Chinese Navy if this deal develops].  Gas from Iran can be transported to Gwadar by pipeline, bypassing the dicey waters of the Hormuz; from Gwadar, it can easily be shipped out to China.  And if China replaces (or less likely, joins) India in this deal, there are plans to eventually build the pipeline north through the Himalayas along the path of the ancient Karakoram Highway into western China.  This would give birth to the IPC (Iran-Pakistan-China) pipeline and obviate the long and timely 12,500 mile sea route along the Pacific rim.  China's role in the resource game should not be underestimated--by making deals for Iraqi oil and Central Asian gas (by a would-be, large Central Asian pipeline), it has outflanked the US without guns, tanks or economy-ravaging occupations.

Gwadar Port
It is the competition of these potential gas lines: IPI vs TAPI, and their many variants that makes Pakistan, and particularly Baluchistan the key piece in the puzzle.  As noted, India's lack of participation does not kill the IP pipeline.  Neither would it be the end-all for the pie-in-the-sky Trans-Afghan line. This pipeline has been drawn to cross central Pakistan (via Quetta and Multan, with spokes to larger Pakistani cities) and head to India.  Instead, it could be re-routed to end in the Baluchi port, of the would-be-Dubai, Gwadar (as planned in all IP variants).  Gwadar is strategically located 250 miles beyond the straits of Hormuz, and with TAP ending there, would satiate American desires (and one-time Soviet dreams) of bringing Caspian gas to the Gulf.  Control of the port of Gwadar would be paramount to any nation involved in developing the TAP, just as it would be for China in the case of IPC.  Hence, stability in the underdeveloped and underappreciated Baluchistan would be necessary. This is not a given considering its restive history and current socio-economic climate.

Given realities on the ground and its self interest in mind, the IPI, IPC or even an IPIC (Iran-Pakistan-India-China, with separate spokes in Pakistan going to India and China) is Pakistan's best option.  If Pakistan ever develops the foresight and fortitude to resist what will undoubtedly be a handsome American payoff (likely already trading hands to some extent) to douse the IP line, it must solve its Baluchistan problem.  An independent and proud people, the Baluchis have always wanted an element of autonomy.  Moreover, they want their share of just compensation for the resources that are plundered from their land.  Baluchistan is home to Pakistan's natural gas supply, as well as largely untapped deposits of copper, uranium, coal, and gold.  Pakistan is predominately ruled by the northeastern province of Punjab and its main port, Karachi in Sindh--the hubs of power and influence.  If you travel to the border city of Lahore, the cultural heart of Punjab, you will appreciate developing infrastructure from highways to high-speed Internet.  Lahore, home to over 10 million people, and other affluent cities such as Karachi are of high priority to the central government of Pakistan.  While Punjab develops, Baluchistan lags behind--literacy rate is below 20% and most don't have access to clean drinking water.  As expected, this disparity has served to only further infuriate the Baluchi public.

TAP variant with Gwadar

The inequity that exists between the province of Baluchistan and its affluent counterpart, Punjab has slowly been driving a wedge through the center of Pakistan, which faces a multitude of other sectarian issues.  Simply put, Punjabis have not given their fellow countrymen the respect and financial opportunities they deserve--and there have been escalations in Baluchistan calling for autonomy, and even secession.  For any chance of success as a nation, and in particular for pipeline development, the rest of Pakistan has to return the Baluchis their fair share, and a seat at the table.  With the prospects of TAPI looking grim, it benefits the US to foment instablity in Baluchistan to prevent the development of an IP/IPI/IPC/IPIC line.  Balkanization certainly remains in play and given the sentiments and unfair treatment of the Baluch, a real possiblity.  The Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), a regional militia, is pushing for an independent Baluchistan and there have been alleged links to many Western intelligence services, including the CIA.  [Baluchistan indpendence is also an Iranian issue--western Baluchistan is in Iran, and not surprisingly, Baluchis are repressed there]  Also, the Dalbandin and Panjgur air bases in Baluchistan are largely believed to be controlled by the United States after 9/11.  If Pakistan wants to profit from the development of an IP or TAP variant, and for Gwadar to fulfill its potential as an economic powerhouse, it must take care of Baluchis.  Pakistan's question should not be, "how do we handle Baluchistan?".  It should be, "is Gwadar going to be getting its gas from South Pars (Iran) or the Caspian (Turkmenistan)?"


An added benefit to consider by the development of an IPI (or the even the much less likely, TAPI) line would be the forced the cooperation of Pakistan and India.  Despite a history of wars and nuclear brinkmanship, a shared pipeline would benefit both nations and help maintain a peace that has been tenuous at best.  Both countries desperately need to divert their budgets from defense to spending on education, infrastructure, technology and manufacturing.  Shockingly, a pipeline could actually promote security and peace in the worlds's most dangerous flashpoint.  Of course, a pipeline that traverses Pakistan would give it some previously non-existent leverage over India, which would obviously be a point of contention.  However, it is not unlike the leverage India currently holds over Pakistan by controlling Kashmir--the source of the Indus river and its many tributaries that drive Pakistan's agriculture and hydrolectric power generation.

Presumably, there are safer, more secure methods and pathways to acquire and distribute natural resources.  But Pipelineistan is what the dreamers dream of--the fastest, cheapest routes with the biggest upside and largest profits.  As we speak, there are oil tycoons, gas executives, tribesman, politicians, presidents, kings and kingmakers--all salivating on how to get in on the action--be it by bribe, coercion or war.  Developing a spider web of pipelines transporting liquid gold is their nirvana, and taming the land on which to build them, their kryptonite.




Special acknowledgement to Pepe Escobar, from whose work was borrowed much information and insight

Friday, February 18, 2011

Drones and Davis


The Drone War that George Bush declared and Barack Obama escalated on Western Pakistan is at a temporary standstill.  Is it over?  By no means--in fact, the hard numbers prove quite the contrary.  Each successive year, the number killed has increased as noted in prior updates.

2004: 5
2005: 7
2006: 23
2007: 77
2008: 313
2009: 724
2010: 993
2011: 47 (to date)

Total: 2189
Bush Era: 413
Obama Era: 1776

The latest attack took place on Jan 23 2011.  Three drone strikes allegedly killed 13 in North Waziristan towns of Doga Mada Khel and Mando Khel. Although, Pakistani intelligence officials claimed the dead were militants, it is quite obvious the locals on the ground felt otherwise.  Up to 2000 protesters decried that the attacks killed civilians, including women and children.  Of course, the international media coverage of this was lacking, as the event was not as glamorous as the ouster of a Tunisian dictator.  With missile strikes raining down upon their villages, the protesting crowd was not endorsing America.  Not exactly an effective method to win the "hearts and minds" of those perceived to be against us.


Unless you have been living under a rock, educate yourself by watching Jersey Shore or are just  geopolitically-challenged, you have heard of Raymond Davis.  Davis is a former US Special Forces agent, who also owns Hyperion Protective Consultants LLC--a company that provides "loss and risk management professionals." (Dave Lindroff asserts that this is a phantom business and offers a very interesting summary and perspective of events)

To summarize, on Jan 27 2011, Davis shot and killed two Pakistani men in Lahore. The ensuing chaos resulted in the death of another person by a vehicle that accompanied him.  Davis was apprehended by Pakistani authorities and upon arrest he proclaimed diplomatic immunity.  This was backed up by statements that followed of the United States.  There has been much debate over the authenticity of his diplomatic status leading to a quasi-standoff between America and its ally, Pakistan.  Some neutral observers believe this "standoff" is being orchestrated for the consumption of the Pakistani public. Recently, Pakistan has stated it will make a decision on Davis's status within three weeks.  The exact nature of business of Davis is under considerable debate:  private security contractor/mercenary or CIA operative.  The fact that he was armed and allegedly had sensitive information regarding the tribal areas in northwest Pakistan, where drone attacks occur, further complicate matters (the Times of India has speculated that he runs the drone program).

Davis and the US claim the men he shot were thieves in the process of attacking him--something that is clearly not believed by the Pakistani public, given Davis's credentials.  Recently, Pakistani officials leaked to ABC News that the two men killed were ISI (Pakistani special intelligence) agents.  If so, were they tracking Davis?  Was it espionage deal gone awry?  Few know the answer to this.  Official reports have Davis currently in a full security prison in Lahore. Conflicting, leaked reports have him living in luxury with access to television, mobile phone and alcohol--a banned substance in Pakistan.  Like many aspects of this case, it is unclear if this is true, but it has further infuriated the average Pakistani.

As Pakistan is assessing Davis's state of immunity, the US has been applying both public and private pressure to have him released.  John Kerry has visited Pakistan and assures that Davis will be prosecuted in America.  There have been quiet threats of suspending the $2 billion in military aid to Pakistan and the cancellation of a would-be meeting between Hillary Clinton and the Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi.  Pakistan holds some leverage (the possession of Davis) but clearly the upper hand resides with the US. This is true considering that the Pakistan governmental hierarchy is strongly aligned, even co-opted by America.  There have been some cries amongst the Pakistani public to exchange Davis for Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani national convicted of terrorism by American court serving an 86 year sentence in a Texas prison.  Most Pakistanis believe she was innocent of the crimes--but such a swap borders on the impossible given that the Pakistani government also considers her a criminal and has expressed no desire for her return or freedom.

Given the strong cooperation between the US and Pakistan regimes, the prediction is that Davis will be released in due time to American custody.  Such a release, without any concessions by the US, will inevitably create a firestorm on a Pakistani street that is quite invested in this case. There are strong feelings that these were unjustified illicit killings, even assassinations, of their fellow countrymen. Relatives of one of the deceased has publicly called for Davis to be hanged. Furthermore, a spouse of one of those killed, has committed suicide--in despair, over a perceived lack of justice. What exactly the concession will be (assuming Davis is released), if there is one, is unknown. The Pakistani public is far more demanding than its government--it is within the realm of  possibility that Davis may have already been transferred to US authorities, if not for the backlash.  Journalist Jeremy Scahill echoed Pakistani sentiment on Twitter: "Serious question:  What would the US do if a Pakistani 'diplomat' shot two FBI agents on US soil?"

The one item of note--is the complete absence of drone attacks since the beginning of this ordeal.  As mentioned, the most recent drone attack occurred on Jan 23.  The Davis incident took place on Jan 27.  It has been 25 days since the last bombing and given their frequency, it is likely more than a coincidence.  Is this the concession the US is willing to make?  Highly doubtful--but it seems to be at least a negotiating tactic as this drama plays out.  Of course, this could be a moot point if Obama authorizes a drone sortie tomorrow.

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Rewriting History


Hosni Mubarak.

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

Two of North Africa's most feared tyrants sacked in a span of weeks--a thought that would be considered unthinkable as little as a month ago.  In one of the most remarkable moments in modern history, nonviolent movements in both Egypt and Tunisia resulted in the toppling of two regimes that held power for a combined 54 years.  Young and old, educated and poor, religious and secular, Muslim and Christian--people came out in droves to demand basic human rights:  freedom, equality, justice.  A perfect storm of unity and the restoration of humanity.  It is not a leap to state that these events are of the greatest political consequence since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Will Egypt transition to a representative government?
Will the future leader of Tunisia be co-opted by Western powers?
Will the fledgling democracies anticipated be wrought with corruption and abuse?
Will there be an uptick in the economic welfare of the average citizen?
Is this the dawn of a new era or false hope?

Predicting the answers to these questions is impossible.  What is not impossible to predict, is how the United States will rewrite history and portray its role in the downfall of these despicable autocrats.

Since 1979, America has written checks to the dictators in Egypt amounting over $64 billion or the GDP of Serbia and Panama combined.  Like Mubarak, Tunisia's Ben Ali was also supported by US military aid and assistance totaling up to $631 million.  These official numbers are in addition to any underhanded gifts and bribes that undoubtedly changed hands.  The Jasmine Revolution (Tunisia) and particularly, the 25 January Revolution (Egypt) exposed the bipartisan American support for some of the most evil regimes in the world--regimes that engaged in torture, rendition, the stifling of freedoms--of speech, the press, and to gather.  It should be understood in no uncertain terms, that Mubarak and Ben Ali were "America's guys" from Reagan to Obama with every Bush and Clinton in between.

As a swelling mass of daily protesters challenged Hosni Mubarak in the now legendary Tahrir Square in central Cairo, the Obama administration kept sending mixed messages in support of Mubarak.  Hillary Clinton hit the Sunday morning talk show circuit and showed her gratitude to the appointment of a vice president (an unoccupied position in Egyptian government).  That vice president, Omar Suleiman, was better known as America's torture coordinator.  A henchman who oversaw rendition, personally engaged in torture and negotiated the closure of the Rafah border in southern Gaza with Israel (a highly unpopular move amongst the Egyptian populace).  The CIA once requested a DNA sample from an Egyptian to determine if he was related to a wanted person.  Suleiman offered to cut off an entire arm from that person to provide that sample.  This was the guy that Obama praised as a suitable successor--and this was also the same guy wholly rejected by the Egyptian populace as a candidate for their leader.


As it became increasing clear to the public that the despots allied with the United States were anything but benevolent, it became difficult for the American government to overtly support them.  However, it was more than obvious that they made their attempts to maintain the status quo and its benefits:  use of the Suez Canal, access to natural resources and Israeli security.  These items far outweighed the freedom and well-being of Egyptian citizenry.  Controlling a "strongman" is certainly easier than manipulating a government reflective of the voice of the people.  Thus, the following statements emerged during the #Jan25 Revolution:

Tony Blair, former British PM:  [Mubarak is] "immensely courageous and a force for good"


Frank Wisner, Obama Special Envoy to Egypt: "The President (Hosni Mubarak) must stay in office to steer those changes through. I therefore believe that President Mubarak's continued leadership is critical"


Joe Biden, US Vice President: "Mubarak has been an ally of ours in a number of things. And he's been very responsible on, relative to geopolitical interest in the region, the Middle East peace efforts; the actions Egypt has taken relative to normalizing relationship with -- with Israel. ... I would not refer to him as a dictator."


Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State: "...I think it's important to follow the transition process announced by the Egyptian government, actually headed by vice-president Omar Suleiman."




Robert Fisk of the Independent characterized the situation:  "One of the blights of history will now involve a U.S. president who held out his hand to the Islamic world and then clenched his fist when it fought a dictatorship and demanded democracy."  It should be noted, and not just inferred, that America held incredible leverage over the likes of Mubarak and Ben Ali as they bankrolled their dominions.  At a time when the desires of the Egyptian people coincided with basic liberties purported by the United States Constitution, Obama and the West clearly turned their back on them.


Unfortunately, as the historic lessons of the past foretell, the actual facts will likely be muddied for personal gain and to avoid historic blemish.  The lack of support by American leadership for amazing, near bloodless revolutions led by armies of young people, via Twitter and Facebook, will be forgotten.  False stories will be told.  Lies will be perpetuated by politicians: "We stood by them, hand in hand to see through democracy." 


The Tunisian populace will not buy into them. The people of Egypt will not buy into them.  It is of much greater importance for the world never to.  

Modern Day Hero



"Dear Western Governments, You've been silent for 30 years supporting the regime that was oppressing us. Please don't get involved now."

--Wael Ghonim, Egyptian Revolution leader on Twitter Feb 11 2011

Saturday, February 12, 2011

Freedom is Never Given


Tuesday, February 8, 2011

Reggie or Ray?

Ali-Frazier, Brady-Manning, Gretzky-Lemiuex.  Some greats will always be remembered in pairs.  Add to that list, Reggie Miller and Ray Allen.  Although their careers intersected for only 9 years, they will always be compared.  They are the two best shooters in NBA history.  Miller turned shooting into an art form.  Ray Allen perfected it.  Who's better?

Reggie Miller entered the NBA in its heyday when Magic was still battling Bird, and Michael Jordan was emerging as the dominant force.  Miller was the backbone of the Indiana Pacers over his 18 year career and "the Man" there for near the entirety.  His elite skill was the three point shot and he knocked down 2560 of them at a 39.5% clip.  He obliterated the existing record of Dale Ellis (1719), one of the best pure shooters of all-time.  His best year behind the arc was in 1996-97 when the 3-point line was shortened and he knocked down 229 at a 42.7% rate.  He was able to take advantage of all 3 years the line was short--with 2 of his most prolific made 3's in that time span.  He shot over 40% 3 pointers for a combined 10 years.  Miller's highest scoring year was his third, 24.6ppg.  He averaged over twenty 5 other years and had a career average of 18.2ppg.  The most assists he ever had was only 4.0 in 1990-91 and the most rebounds, only 3.9 (twice).

On paper, Ray Allen obliterates Miller.  Allen averaged over 20ppg for 9 consecutive years, maxing out at 26.4 ppg in 2006-07 with Seattle.  After that peak year, he was traded to Boston, a team with two other big stars, dropping to an average of 17.4ppg.  Conceivably, and quite likely he would still be averaging over 20ppg (for a total streak of 12 years running) if he didn't have to sacrifice his stats on a better team.  His career average is 20.5ppg despite having lesser scoring opportunities over the previous 3 years.  This is an adjustment Miller never had to make as he was on Indiana his whole career, in the same system and pecking order.  Despite the arrival of very talented players like Jermaine O'Neal, there were no superstars that forced him to limit his scoring potential.  Again Allen, was mainly a scorer but in 2002-03 averaged 5.6rpg and 5.9apg far surpassing the best of Miller's years.  Allen also holds the higher career averages in rebounding, assists and steals.  As for the 3 ball, Allen is one short of Miller's career record, sitting at 2559.  He's on pace to break this Thursday night versus the Lakers at the Garden.  His 3 point shooting percentage at 39.8 is a hair above Miller's 39.5.  Allen played only his rookie year with the shortened 3 line and made 117 of them.  He happened to make more 3's than that 13 other times (with the reinstituted longer 3 point line) in his career with a peak in 2005-06 at 269.  He needs to only make 5 more this year to surpass that 117 again and the season has over 30 games left.  So whereas Miller's feasted on 3 pointers with a ridiculously shortened line, Allen never really had the opportunity to cherry pick and inflate his stats when the 3 point line was high schoolesque.

Both guys have been amazing at the free throw line.  Allen has a career 89.3% FT to-date, and Miller finished at 88.8%. Allen remained a ridiculously consistent 89.6% during the playoffs and in typical Reggie style, he upped the ante to 89.3% (okay, so you're not that impressed by a 0.5% increase).  Allen averaged 19.5ppg in the second season and Miller increased his scoring to 20.6ppg.  So, yes Miller improved his scoring in the playoffs and Allen dipped but it should be noted that almost half of Allen's playoff years and a significant majority of his playoff games came as a Celtic, where he was the second or third scoring option.



Without a doubt, Reggie Miller is known for being absolutely clutch in the playoffs.  He is immortalized in the Association for his 8 points in 11 seconds vs the Knicks in 1995 as well as the 25 point 4th quarter explosion in 1994 vs the Knicks, again, in the playoffs.  The Knicks actually came back and won that series but that has been largely forgotten when recounting Reggie lore.  Ray's playoff heroics are less memorable but his championship-clinching Game 6 performance in 2008 vs the Lakers can never be forgotten:  26 points, 7-9 from three point land.  Unfortunately, his choke job in 2010 (0-13 Game 3) largely erased the memories of 2008 and completely erased that of his record 8 3-pointers (Game 2, 2010).  Reggie's legacy is thus far more memorable--unfairly or not.

Despite being amazingly clutch and the two best shooters of all-time, neither has been good enough to be "the Man" on a team and take it to a title.  Miller was never surrounded by elite talent unless you consider the Flying Dutchman aka Rik Smits to be All-Pro material.  The Davis Brothers, Chuck Person, Jalen Rose, Jermaine O'Neal and Mark Jackson were all excellent players--but Reggie at his peak was better than all of them.  It is one of the reasons he never won a championship.  Had he been a second fiddle to somebody better from his era like Shaq or Barkley, he may have had a few rings.  The closest he came to achieving that was in 2000, when he had a phenomenal run with a playoff 24ppg, only to become the sacrificial lamb to the Shaq-Kobe Chainsaw Massacre, Part 1.

Allen was not blessed with superstar teammates either (until the Celtics of course)--Big Dog Glen Robinson was a solid scorer and helped Allen to propel the Bucks to the Eastern Conference Finals in 2000-01 and losing to the Sixers (which was all for the better, because they would undoubtedly be the goat to be sacrificed for the Shaq-Kobe Chainsaw Massacre, Part 2).  He had a decent Rashard Lewis in Seattle, but again, Allen was better than him and the remaining spare parts were like that of a Kia.  Ultimately, Ray Allen was traded to Boston where he teamed with superstars Paul Pierce and Kevin Garnett and obtained the ring that eluded him.  It's not a knock on Allen or Miller that they were unable to be the lead guys on a championship team--only the most elite of players are in that category:  Jordan, Magic, Bird, Shaq, Kobe, Hakeem, Duncan, etc.  The 2004 Detroit Pistons are the exception--but that was largely due to the Lakers implosion as opposed to the Piston's success.



It should be noted that Miller played his entire career with the Pacers and is the best player in team history.  He's a legend and teams had to primarily and specifically game plan against him.  Everybody knew he was going to get the ball at the end of the game and he reviled in it.  He went toe-to-toe with Jordan at a time when few dared, and challenged him head-on when most collapsed in fear.  He helped build the Bulls-Pacers rivalry, and took over the Knicks-Pacers feud.  He pulverized Patrick Ewing and made Spike Lee look plain silly.  Reggie Miller was the Pacers.

Ray Allen* was traded two times--and never will go down as the best player in the history of the Bucks (Kareem), Supersonics (Gary Payton) or Celtics (Russell/Bird).  Reggie Miller could never have been traded--although like Allen, perhaps it would have been ultimately better for his career.  He may have won a championship as a Laker or Spur sharpshooter but at the cost of iconic status in Indianapolis.  Aside from shooting, Allen's game is arguably better with his ability to get to the rim and finish.  However, Miller's ability to get to the free throw line was only matched by the truly elite superstars in the game.  Both relied on a series of frenzied picks to create their best shots.  Reggie's shot was one of the most unorthodox in history, further adding to his legendary status.  Ray's shot is pure artistry--exactly textbook, an obvious result of endless practice and a maniacal 4 hour pregame, warm-up regimen.

Reggie's last few years were watered down with diminished output but he remained a late-game assassin.  Ray Allen is still going strong much later in his career--some of this is due to new advanced conditioning techniques, but much of it unquestionably due to his largely undiminished skill set.  And as pointed out earlier, much of his current statistical "decline" is a function of his secondary/tertiary status on the Celtics.  At age 35, he is averaging 17.5ppg, 50.7% FG (career-high), 46.2% 3 point (career-high).  Arguably one of the best years of his career in his 15th season.

Reggie Miller has meant more to the league--largely due to playoff heroics, his flair/persona and iconic status.  But when you really break it down, Ray Allen has had a better career and he can end the debate altogether if he keeps on going like this just a little bit longer.  Adding 3 pointers #2560 and #2561 will go a long way in pouring some cement to his argument.  And quite possibly Reggie Miller will be calling that game on TNT, Thursday night.

Who would I rather pay to watch?

Reggie Miller.  Hands down.

If somebody had a gun to my head, and the guy I picked needed to make the shot or I would die?

Ray Allen**  By a hair.


* Important to note that Ray Allen played Jesus Shuttleworth in He Got Game. Allen has a Hollywood status that Miller will never match--this somewhat negates that he was traded. Twice.  Perhaps Spike Lee knew that Miller-Allen was going to be a future debate and tabbed Allen, to get back at Reggie?  Miller roasted Lee's beloved Knicks in 1994 and 1995.  He Got Game debuted in 1998.  You need to consider this.

**Of course if it was 2010 NBA Finals, I would be six underground.

Addendum:  3000 3Point Field Goals Made is in play for Allen as is a possible Finals MVP.  Allen also has 10 All-Star appearances to Miller's 5.  Allen never took his team to the Finals as his team's alpha dog.  Miller did this once (as mentioned above).

Sunday, February 6, 2011

Rashid Khalidi on Egyptian Situation


Really?


"The people gave me the responsibility of building the future of this nation. And I did it with honor."


--Hosni Mubarak



Saturday, February 5, 2011

Our Son of a Bitch

Short video that explains America's relationships with a select few autocrats:



Friday, February 4, 2011

Face of Egypt




Thursday, February 3, 2011

Chomsky Musings on Egypt

Fisk: Obama Administration Gutless

"One of the blights of history will now involve a U.S. president who held out his hand to the Islamic world and then clenched his fist when it fought a dictatorship and demanded democracy."


-- Robert Fisk

Colonialism Never Dies




"Oil is much too important a commodity to be left in the hands of the Arabs."


--Henry Kissinger

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

Return of the Thugs

The brutal pro-regime thugs of Mubarak are back.  This time, they came armed with knives, clubs, rocks and whips creating a medieval battle scene. Some even attacked innocent protesters on horse and camelback.  The United States' policy of propping and arming repressive autocrats in the Middle East is being quickly exposed.  Egypt is home to some of the worst acts of torture in modern history, and a stalwart on the Rendition Circuit.  Thus far, the statements and actions by the Obama Administration have been self-serving, appalling and reek of utter hypocrisy.