Saturday, February 19, 2011

Pipelines and Pipedreams



Pepe Escobar appropriately dubs the most important region in the world as Pipelineistan.  It is the heart of Asia: the confluence of the Middle East with Central and South Asia. Pipelineistan's immense reserves of oil and gas and the myriad, dizzying array of potential pipeline networks within, give credence to this name. Local militas to world superpowers--all are stakeholders of this precious land--and battle on for the control and distribution of its copious amounts of liquid gold.  Pipelineistan is the ultimate geopolitical powder keg and there more than a few matches in the vicinity.  Instability and conflict are ongoing.

Ground zero of this war lies in Baluchistan--the large, arid southwestern province of Pakistan and it contains the ulimate prize:  the deep, warm-water, port city of Gwadar.  Baluchistan consumes almost half of the land in Pakistan but represents less than four percent of its population. The barren, sparse unheralded land of the Baluch is the focal point of Pipelineistan and it holds the potential key to future peace and prosperity; or alternatively, to one that may unlock more death and destruction.

It is well-established that natural resources are a finite commodity.  The future of energy undoubtedly needs to be produced from green, renewable sources in entirety.  It is debatable if that time will be reached in fifty or five hundred years.  Fast, emerging markets in the largest population centers of the world--China and India, are further taxing a continually increasing demand of oil and gas.  With supply dwindling, the resource wars have only intensified, and rage onward.

The rich natural gas reserves in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia have always been challenged with the problem of efficient distribution.  The dream scenario--access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean has proven elusive. This route faces the daunting task of making its way through a perennially unstable Afghanistan, and ultimately the perilous sands of Baluchistan--to Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea.  With stationary gas yearning to be transported, potential profit is being flagrantly wasted.


It has been largely argued that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was for this very reason--to clear and control land for profit-making pipelines. The USSR's Afghan occupation of the 1980s also caused immense distress within Pakistan, as it believed that it was next in line for hostile Russian activities.  There was a palpable fear of Russia annexing Baluchistan, in order to complete the goal of this ultimate pipeline. [Pakistani fears were exacerbated by the Russian alliance with its eastern neighbor/enemy, India.  Pakistan had enemy troops on both borders and felt the squeeze, much like modern day Iran, surrounded by vast amounts of US troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan]  The Soviet occupation failed largely due to Amero-Pak collaboration in funding and training the Afghani resistance fighters better known as mujahideen--a time when the US and Pakistan openly supported "jihad".   Eventually, the conflict resulted in a Soviet loss, with a subsequent withdrawal completed in 1989.  This may have killed USSR's  "pipe dream", but it only created hope and opportunity for other imperialists lying in wait.


Unocal Corporation, once a major American petroleum player (now dissolved into a Chevron subsidiary), had wide-eyed plans to deliver gas from the land-locked Caspian to the blue waters of the Arabian Sea.  Upon the breakup of the USSR, the newly independent Central Asian republics were ripe for American desires, to cash in on this money train.  As the Taliban were slowly taking over Afghanistan, Unocal was prepping the course for the pipeline.  Negotiations between Unocal and the Taliban failed despite their close links [it has been widely reported that Unocal security forces and the CIA helped the Taliban take Kabul].  No deal came to fruition and by mid-2001 the Bush regime had decided that the Taliban would be forcibly removed.  After 9/11, in late 2001, with a very convenient narrative to chase out the Taliban, the United States was able to gain the footing it had always desired, by invading Afghanistan.  A lightning, quick victory with complete territorial control never materialized.  The Taliban decided to retreat from the cities, regroup, and return in periodic waves, years later, badgering the diminishing NATO forces.  This unexpected, long guerilla war sidetracked any American ability to build and secure a pipeline.

Plans to develop this pipeline have not died but have been put on hold indefinitely. It has become increasingly clear after a fledgling, decade long American-led occupation, that reigning in the submission of the Afghans is untenable.  The only hopes to build a Trans-Afghan Pipeline (TAP) will be through negotiating a peace.  NATO will have to withdraw--the only questions are when, and on what terms.  The United States did not heed the historic lessons of Afghanistan--they are a people that are not conquered.  The Soviets failed.  The British failed.  Genghis Khan failed.


Meanwhile, over the past decade, Iran also has been planning to develop a pipeline to fulfill its ambitions to export its vast stockpiles of natural gas from the South Pars field in the Perisan Gulf.  South Pars is quite likely the largest gas field in the world, shared by Iran and Qatar.  Due to a variety of reasons ranging from economic to political to philosophical, Iran has become increasingly isolated from much of the Western world--largely due to the influence of its arch-nemesis, the United States.  Iran not only wants to find a customer for its natural gas product, but to diversify its oil-based portfolio.

Iran has proposed the Iran-Pakistan-India or IPI pipeline. This $7.2 billion USD project will supply natural gas to both Pakistan and its sworn enemy/neighbor, India (which is why it is also known as the "peace pipeline.")  India needs the gas for its expanding population and rapid industrial growth.  Pakistan needs the gas as well, but it stands to profit more by the rent it can earn from India and Iran as a crucial part of the supply chain.  There are many issues that complicate this deal.  India and Pakistan have fought three deadly wars in little over 60 years of existence and do not trust each other;  instability in Pakistan, particularly in Baluchistan will certainly threaten the security of such a line;  and most importantly, the United States and its Western counterparts are firmly against it.  The IPI pipeline would not only stenghten Iran, but put into doubt, and likely crush the development of a Trans-Afghan pipeline--destroying one of the underlying goals of the long, costly Afghan occupation.


The easiest way for the US to sabotage the IPI is to eliminate the end-user.  India, perhaps the key to making the project viable, allegedly pulled out of the deal in late 2009.  [However, this remains unofficial and its participation still remains in play, at least according to Iran. There are reports of India's renewed interest in trilateral talks with Pakistan and Iran.]  There are strong suspicions that India is bowing out as a precondition set by the US for implementation of the Indo-American civilian nuclear deal of 2008. India also remains afraid of making any deal with its mortal enemy, Pakistan and further blames it for demanding too exorbitant a cost as the middle man.  Pakistan and Iran have inked a deal to go onwards with the IP pipeline--much of the construction on the Irani side is alleged to be complete. It is well-known that America is pressuring Pakistan to withdraw completely as well.  They are being offered various forms of aid to captiulate and many believe that evenutally there will be a sweet enough deal to make that happen (and it probably already has, at least temporarily with the existing Pakistani government).  It is not exactly a hidden secret either that Pakistani leadership operates under American instruction, co-opted;  the American ambassador in Islamabad, effectively a viceroy.

Ideally, the United States, in its self-proclaimed role as the world superpower would like to be in charge of distribution of gas and still offers to Pakistan the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAP) also known as Turkmenistan-Afgahnistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline.  TAPI would originate in the Dauletabad gas fields near the Turkmenistan-Iran border, in the Amu-Darya basin.  Turkmenistan is also home to the Yolotan-Osman fields of the Caspian, reportedly home to 14 trillion cubic centimeters of nautral gas--5 times the size of Dauletabad--which could be linked by a spoke.  This gas is fervently seeking  a non-Russian escape route to the southeast [there is a line from Dauletabad to Iran].  However, for many reasons already noted such as the little problem the Americans are facing in Kandahar (a key node in the line), the development of such a line remains far more theoretical than practical.  Thus, the United States is more likely to derail the IPI/IP line by other forms of aid/bribe to Pakistani higher-ups.

Wakhan Corridor

In reality, the TAP/TAPI pipelines are currently nothing short of a pipedream.  The failed NATO excursion in Afghanistan has cemented another cycle of quasi-permanent instability.  Even the world's largest armies have been unable to provide the security that any corporation requires to protect their investment.  This leaves the United States dangling the smaller carrot to Pakistan of building a pipeline through the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan.  Wakhan is the easternmost extent of Afghanistan, lying in the Pamir Mountains, between Tajikistan and the Hindu Kush mountain range of Pakistan.  This sparsely populated panhandle is better known for snow leopards, drug smuggling and the largest time zone change in the world (3.5 hours) than as a potential gas route.  Furthermore, construction in this region will be nearly impossible given its rough terrain and that of the adjacent Pakistani Northern Areas.  This option fails for Pakistan for a multitutde of reasons--Pakistan can not pay for gas imports alone and needs additional countries beyond it to collect rent money. Moreover, the development of Gwadar, which is not a part of the proposed route, is absent.

As for the IPI/IP line--what would be India's loss by pulling out, would be somebody else's gain--none other than its long time rival, China.  China covets the same South Pars gas as India and both Iran and Pakistan are lobbying hard for it to step into the deal, and save the day.  In fact, the port city of Gwadar has largely been built by China (over $0.2 billion USD invested) and it probably held such intentions for a long time [it has been reported that China has sovereign rights over Gwadar's port facilities and some speculate it could be guarded by Chinese Navy if this deal develops].  Gas from Iran can be transported to Gwadar by pipeline, bypassing the dicey waters of the Hormuz; from Gwadar, it can easily be shipped out to China.  And if China replaces (or less likely, joins) India in this deal, there are plans to eventually build the pipeline north through the Himalayas along the path of the ancient Karakoram Highway into western China.  This would give birth to the IPC (Iran-Pakistan-China) pipeline and obviate the long and timely 12,500 mile sea route along the Pacific rim.  China's role in the resource game should not be underestimated--by making deals for Iraqi oil and Central Asian gas (by a would-be, large Central Asian pipeline), it has outflanked the US without guns, tanks or economy-ravaging occupations.

Gwadar Port
It is the competition of these potential gas lines: IPI vs TAPI, and their many variants that makes Pakistan, and particularly Baluchistan the key piece in the puzzle.  As noted, India's lack of participation does not kill the IP pipeline.  Neither would it be the end-all for the pie-in-the-sky Trans-Afghan line. This pipeline has been drawn to cross central Pakistan (via Quetta and Multan, with spokes to larger Pakistani cities) and head to India.  Instead, it could be re-routed to end in the Baluchi port, of the would-be-Dubai, Gwadar (as planned in all IP variants).  Gwadar is strategically located 250 miles beyond the straits of Hormuz, and with TAP ending there, would satiate American desires (and one-time Soviet dreams) of bringing Caspian gas to the Gulf.  Control of the port of Gwadar would be paramount to any nation involved in developing the TAP, just as it would be for China in the case of IPC.  Hence, stability in the underdeveloped and underappreciated Baluchistan would be necessary. This is not a given considering its restive history and current socio-economic climate.

Given realities on the ground and its self interest in mind, the IPI, IPC or even an IPIC (Iran-Pakistan-India-China, with separate spokes in Pakistan going to India and China) is Pakistan's best option.  If Pakistan ever develops the foresight and fortitude to resist what will undoubtedly be a handsome American payoff (likely already trading hands to some extent) to douse the IP line, it must solve its Baluchistan problem.  An independent and proud people, the Baluchis have always wanted an element of autonomy.  Moreover, they want their share of just compensation for the resources that are plundered from their land.  Baluchistan is home to Pakistan's natural gas supply, as well as largely untapped deposits of copper, uranium, coal, and gold.  Pakistan is predominately ruled by the northeastern province of Punjab and its main port, Karachi in Sindh--the hubs of power and influence.  If you travel to the border city of Lahore, the cultural heart of Punjab, you will appreciate developing infrastructure from highways to high-speed Internet.  Lahore, home to over 10 million people, and other affluent cities such as Karachi are of high priority to the central government of Pakistan.  While Punjab develops, Baluchistan lags behind--literacy rate is below 20% and most don't have access to clean drinking water.  As expected, this disparity has served to only further infuriate the Baluchi public.

TAP variant with Gwadar

The inequity that exists between the province of Baluchistan and its affluent counterpart, Punjab has slowly been driving a wedge through the center of Pakistan, which faces a multitude of other sectarian issues.  Simply put, Punjabis have not given their fellow countrymen the respect and financial opportunities they deserve--and there have been escalations in Baluchistan calling for autonomy, and even secession.  For any chance of success as a nation, and in particular for pipeline development, the rest of Pakistan has to return the Baluchis their fair share, and a seat at the table.  With the prospects of TAPI looking grim, it benefits the US to foment instablity in Baluchistan to prevent the development of an IP/IPI/IPC/IPIC line.  Balkanization certainly remains in play and given the sentiments and unfair treatment of the Baluch, a real possiblity.  The Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), a regional militia, is pushing for an independent Baluchistan and there have been alleged links to many Western intelligence services, including the CIA.  [Baluchistan indpendence is also an Iranian issue--western Baluchistan is in Iran, and not surprisingly, Baluchis are repressed there]  Also, the Dalbandin and Panjgur air bases in Baluchistan are largely believed to be controlled by the United States after 9/11.  If Pakistan wants to profit from the development of an IP or TAP variant, and for Gwadar to fulfill its potential as an economic powerhouse, it must take care of Baluchis.  Pakistan's question should not be, "how do we handle Baluchistan?".  It should be, "is Gwadar going to be getting its gas from South Pars (Iran) or the Caspian (Turkmenistan)?"


An added benefit to consider by the development of an IPI (or the even the much less likely, TAPI) line would be the forced the cooperation of Pakistan and India.  Despite a history of wars and nuclear brinkmanship, a shared pipeline would benefit both nations and help maintain a peace that has been tenuous at best.  Both countries desperately need to divert their budgets from defense to spending on education, infrastructure, technology and manufacturing.  Shockingly, a pipeline could actually promote security and peace in the worlds's most dangerous flashpoint.  Of course, a pipeline that traverses Pakistan would give it some previously non-existent leverage over India, which would obviously be a point of contention.  However, it is not unlike the leverage India currently holds over Pakistan by controlling Kashmir--the source of the Indus river and its many tributaries that drive Pakistan's agriculture and hydrolectric power generation.

Presumably, there are safer, more secure methods and pathways to acquire and distribute natural resources.  But Pipelineistan is what the dreamers dream of--the fastest, cheapest routes with the biggest upside and largest profits.  As we speak, there are oil tycoons, gas executives, tribesman, politicians, presidents, kings and kingmakers--all salivating on how to get in on the action--be it by bribe, coercion or war.  Developing a spider web of pipelines transporting liquid gold is their nirvana, and taming the land on which to build them, their kryptonite.




Special acknowledgement to Pepe Escobar, from whose work was borrowed much information and insight

2 comments:

  1. It should be noted that Hamid Karzai, installed as the puppet leader of Afghanistan in 2001 (before being formally elected in 2004), had alleged ties to Unocal or other parts of its consortium.

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  2. This is all about access, particularly the struggle between the West and Russia for access to the Eurasian oil and gas bonanza.

    This is an issue that has been the root cause of much of the political maneuvering and backroom deals for the past decade in particular but this goes back to the fall of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian, Muslim republics. Russia itself has large reserves of oil and is one of the world's largest exporters but it was more than willing to let large resource-rich areas it formerly controlled like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan secede while clinging to smaller countries like Chechnya and throwing its weight around in Georgia and Abhkazia.

    There's the rub or the fly in the ointment, the lack of a southern pipeline, that's the main pipe dream I believe. I know you focused on Central Asian hydrocarbons and a pipeline terminating in Gwadar but another thing that bears mentioning is that recently in 05 Russia's stranglehold was broken and a Western pipeline was opened, the BTC or Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan line connecting Azerbaijan with the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Med coast via Tblisi, Georgia. This ought to help explain why Putin and Co. invaded Georgia and helped Abkhazia break away. That's also why they'll never let Chechnya go, the two main Caspian basin pipelines pass right through Chechnya and Russia has been punishing both Chechnya and Georgia for threatening to break its bottleneck monopoly.

    So the BTC pipeline helped free Azerbaijan from relying on two bad options, Russia or Iran, besides most of its customers are in the West. Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan has been shipping his oil in tankers to Baku and exporting them via BTC as well, thereby also bypassing Russia. But the BTC lacks the volume and capacity to be the only outlet that's where your alternate pipelines South to Gwadar come into play.

    I agree with you that an IPIC pipeline would be the best compromise and in Pakistan's interest, it would be to everyone's advantage except Russia though China and India would bristle about spokes in their rival territories. I doubt any TAP or TAPI pipeline will occur any time soon due to the realities on the ground in Afghanistan which you and Ahmed Rashid and others have covered quite well. US plans have largely been foiled here and they got their due for their bloody invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. I think the South Pars field and the Tengiz reserves in Kazakhstan will be the next big thing and like u said the former Unocal/Chevron have a lot invested, I think of them as Occidental Petroleum from movies like Syriana.

    I hadn't heard much about the Gwadar situation of late, thanks for dotting the eyes and crossing the tees on that. It's unfortunate indeed if Pak allows China to station its naval forces in Gwadar and gives it sovereign rights to the area. Personally I think if Pakistan doesn't mend its ways and give the Baluchis what they want in the very near future then Baluchistan may well be the next part of Pakistan to secede, maybe even Irani Baluchistan will join them. I've long thought that the Kurds ought to have their own country too but that would antagonize the Arabs, Turks and Iranians, which is everyone else in the Middle East who isn't Kurdish so it's highly unlikely.

    It's been unfortunate that Pakistan has sold out its sovereignty as much as it has to the US and made war on its own ppl but most Pakistanis seem to have no issues or problem when it comes to selling out to China. In many ways Pakistan is happy to be China's poodle now and of course China famously called Pak its Israel but unlike Israel wagging the US dog Pak is sadly very much a traditional tail being wagged by the Chinese dragon mostly at India but increasingly at the US Eagle biting the tale, taking a chunk out of it and hanging on for dear life.

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